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1. Introduction
There are two ways to influence decision making: delegation and persuasion. The
delegation literature, initiated by Holmstro¨m (1984), studies the design of decision
rules. The persuasion literature, set in motion by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011),
studies the design of information disclosure rules.
The delegation problem has been used to design organizational decision processes
(Dessein, 2002), monopoly regulation policies (Alonso and Matouschek, 2008), and
international trade agreements (Amador and Bagwell, 2013). The persuasion prob-
lem has been used to design school grading policies (Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2010),
internet advertising strategies (Rayo and Segal, 2010), and forensic tests (Kamenica
and Gentzkow, 2011).
This paper shows that, under general assumptions, the delegation and persuasion
problems are equivalent, thereby bridging the two strands of literature. The implica-
tion is that the existing insights and results in one problem can be used to understand
and solve the other problem.
Both delegation and persuasion problems have a principal and an agent whose payoffs
depend on an agent’s decision and a state of the world. The sets of decisions and states
are intervals of the real line. The agent’s payoff function satisfies standard single-
peakedness and sorting conditions. In a delegation problem, the agent privately knows
the state and the principal commits to a set of decisions from which the agent chooses.
In a persuasion problem, the principal designs the agent’s information structure and
the agent freely chooses a decision. The principal’s tradeoff is that giving more
discretion to the agent in the delegation problem and disclosing more information to
the agent in the persuasion problem allows for better use of information about the
state, but limits control over the biased agent’s decision.
We consider balanced delegation and monotone persuasion problems. In the balanced
delegation problem, the principal may not be able to exclude certain indispensable de-
cisions of the agent. This problem nests the standard delegation problem and includes,
in particular, a novel delegation problem with an agent’s participation constraint.
In the monotone persuasion problem, the principal chooses a monotone partitional
information structure that either reveals the state or pools it with adjacent states.
This problem incorporates constraints faced by information designers in practice. For
example, a non-monotone grading policy that gives better grades to worse performing
students will be perceived as unfair and will be manipulated by strategic students.
Moreover, in many special cases, optimal information structures are monotone parti-
tions.
The main result of the paper is that the balanced delegation and monotone persuasion
problems are strategically equivalent. For each primitive of one problem we explicitly
construct an equivalent primitive of the other problem. This construction equates
the marginal payoffs and swaps the roles of decisions and states in the two problems.
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Intuitively, decisions in the delegation problem play the role of states in the persua-
sion problem because the principal controls decisions in the delegation problem and
(information about) states in the persuasion problem. It is worth noting that this
equivalence result is fundamentally different from the revelation principle. Specific-
ally, the sets of implementable (and, therefore, optimal) decision outcomes generally
differ in the delegation and persuasion problems with the same payoff functions.
To prove the equivalence result, we show that the balanced delegation and monotone
persuasion problems are equivalent to the following discriminatory disclosure prob-
lem. The principal’s and agent’s payoffs depend on an agent’s binary action, a state
of the world, and an agent’s private type. The sets of states and types are intervals of
the real line. The agent’s payoff function is single-crossing in the state and type. The
principal designs a menu of cutoff tests, where a cutoff test discloses whether the state
is below or above a cutoff. The agent selects a test from the menu and chooses between
inaction and action depending on his private type and the information revealed by
the test.
To see why the discriminatory disclosure problem is equivalent to the balanced deleg-
ation problem, observe that the agent’s essential decision is the selection of a cutoff
test from the menu. Because the agent’s payoff function is single-crossing in the
state, the agent optimally chooses inaction/action if the selected test discloses that
the state is below/above the cutoff. Thus, this problem can be interpreted as a del-
egation problem in which a delegation set is identified with a menu of cutoffs, and
the agent’s decision with his selection of a cutoff from the menu.
To see why the discriminatory disclosure problem is equivalent to the monotone per-
suasion problem, observe that each menu of cutoff tests defines a monotone partition
of the state space. Because the agent’s payoff function is single-crossing in the state,
the agent’s optimal choice between inaction and action is the same whether he ob-
serves the partition element that contains the state or the result of the optimally
selected cutoff test. Moreover, because the agent’s payoff function is single-crossing
in his type, the agent optimally chooses inaction/action if his type is below/above a
threshold. Thus, this problem can be interpreted as a persuasion problem in which a
monotone partition is identified with a menu of cutoffs, and the agent’s decision with
a threshold type.
We use our equivalence result to solve a monopoly regulation problem in which a
welfare-maximizing regulator (principal) restricts the set of prices available to a mono-
polist (agent) who privately knows his cost. This problem was first studied by Baron
and Myerson (1982) as a mechanism design problem with transfers. Alonso and
Matouschek (2008) pointed out that transfers between the regulator and monopolist
are often forbidden, and thus, the monopoly regulation problem can be formulated
as a delegation problem. Alonso and Matouschek (2008) omitted the monopolist’s
participation constraint, so under their optimal regulation policy, the monopolist
sometimes operates at a loss. Amador and Bagwell (2016) characterized the optimal
regulation policy taking the participation constraint into account.
                             4 / 36
 4 KOLOTILIN AND ZAPECHELNYUK
The monopoly regulation problem, with and without the participation constraint,
can be formulated as a balanced delegation problem. We provide an elegant method
of solving this problem, by recasting it as a monotone persuasion problem and using
a single result from the persuasion literature. When the demand function is linear
and the cost distribution is unimodal, the optimal regulation policy takes a simple
form that is often used in practice. The regulator imposes a price cap and allows
the monopolist to choose any price not exceeding the cap. The optimal price cap is
higher when the participation constraint is present; so the monopolist is given more
discretion when he has an option to exit.
The literature has focused on linear delegation and linear persuasion in which the
marginal payoffs are linear in the decision and the state, respectively. We show
the equivalence of linear balanced delegation and linear monotone persuasion. We
translate a linear delegation problem to the equivalent linear persuasion problem
and solve it using methods in Kolotilin (2018) and Dworczak and Martini (2019).
Specifically, we provide conditions under which a candidate delegation set is optimal.
For an interval delegation set, these conditions coincide with those in Alonso and
Matouschek (2008), Amador and Bagwell (2013), and Amador, Bagwell, and Frankel
(2018), but we impose weaker regularity assumptions. For a two-interval delegation
set, our conditions are novel and imply special cases in Melumad and Shibano (1991)
and Alonso and Matouschek (2008).
Our equivalence result can also be used to translate the existing results in nonlin-
ear delegation problems to equivalent nonlinear persuasion problems, and vice versa.
Nonlinear delegation is considered in Holmstro¨m (1984), Alonso and Matouschek
(2008), Amador and Bagwell (2013), and Amador, Bagwell, and Frankel (2018). Non-
linear persuasion is considered in Rayo and Segal (2010), Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011), Kolotilin (2018), Dworczak and Martini (2019), and Guo and Shmaya (2019).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the balanced
delegation and monotone persuasion problems. In Section 3, we present and prove the
equivalence result. In Section 4, we apply the equivalence result to solve a monopoly
regulation problem. In Section 5, we address the linear delegation problem using
tools from the persuasion literature. In Section 6, we present the equivalence result
under weaker assumptions. In Section 7, we make concluding remarks. The appendix
contains omitted proofs.
2. Two Problems
2.1. Primitives. There are a principal (she) and an agent (he). The agent’s payoff
U(θ, x) and principal’s payoff V (θ, x) depend on a decision x ∈ [0, 1] and a state
θ ∈ [0, 1]. The state is uniformly distributed. We assume that the marginal payoffs
are continuous, and the agent’s payoff is supermodular and concave in the decision,1
1We relax these assumptions in Section 6.
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(A1)
∂
∂x
U(θ, x) and ∂
∂x
V (θ, x) are well defined and continuous in θ and x;
(A2)
∂
∂x
U(θ, x) is strictly increasing in θ and strictly decreasing in x.
A pair (U, V ) is called a primitive of the problem. Let P be the set of all primitives
that satisfy assumptions (A1) and (A2).
We now describe two problems. In a delegation problem, the agent is fully informed
and the principal restricts the agent’s discretion. In a persuasion problem, the agent
has full discretion and the principal restricts the agent’s information.
In both problems, the principal chooses a closed subset Π of [0, 1] that contains the
elements 0 and 1. Let
Π = {Π ⊂ [0, 1] : Π is closed and {0, 1} ⊂ Π}.
In the delegation problem, Π describes a set of decisions from which the agent chooses.
In the persuasion problem, Π describes a partition of states that the agent observes.
2.2. Balanced Delegation Problem. Consider a primitive (UD, VD) ∈ P , where we
use subscript D to refer to the delegation problem. The principal chooses a delegation
set Π ∈ Π. The agent privately observes the state θ and chooses a decision x ∈ Π
that maximizes his payoff,
x∗D(θ,Π) = arg max
x∈Π
UD(θ, x). (1a)
The principal’s objective is to maximize her expected payoff,
max
Π∈Π
E
[
VD(θ, x
∗
D(θ,Π))
]
. (1b)
By (A2), x
∗
D(θ,Π) is single-valued for almost all θ, so E
[
VD(θ, x
∗
D(θ,Π))
]
is well defined.
The balanced delegation problem requires delegation sets to include the extreme de-
cisions. On the one hand, this requirement can be made non-binding by defining the
agent’s and principal’s payoffs on a sufficiently large interval of decisions so that the
extreme decisions are never chosen (Appendix A.3). On the other hand, this require-
ment allows to include indispensable decisions of the agent, such as a participation
decision (Sections 4 and 5.3).
2.3. Monotone Persuasion Problem. Consider a primitive (UP , VP ) ∈ P , where
we use subscript P to refer to the persuasion problem. The principal chooses a
monotone partitional information structure that partitions the state space into convex
sets: separating elements and pooling intervals. A monotone partition is described
by a set Π ∈ Π of boundary points of these partition elements. Let
pi(θ) = sup{θ′ ∈ Π : θ′ ≤ θ} and pi(θ) = inf{θ′ ∈ Π : θ′ > θ}
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for θ ∈ [0, 1), and pi(1) = pi(1) = 1. The partition element µΠ(θ) that contains
θ ∈ [0, 1] is given by
µΠ(θ) =
{
{θ}, if pi(θ) = pi(θ),
[pi(θ), pi(θ)), if pi(θ) < pi(θ).
For example, Π = {0, 1} is the uninformative partition that pools all states,2 and
Π = [0, 1] is the fully informative partition that separates all states.
The agent observes the partition element µΠ(θ) that contains the state θ and chooses
a decision x ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes his expected payoff given the posterior belief
about θ,
x∗P (θ,Π) ∈ arg max
x∈[0,1]
E
[
UP (θ
′, x)
∣∣θ′ ∈ µΠ(θ)]. (2a)
The principal’s objective is to maximize her expected payoff,
max
Π∈Π
E
[
VP (θ, x
∗
P (θ,Π))
]
. (2b)
By (A2), x
∗
P (θ,Π) is single-valued for all θ, so E
[
VP (θ, x
∗
P (θ,Π))
]
is well defined.
The monotone persuasion problem requires information structures to be monotone
partitions. On the one hand, this requirement is without loss of generality in many
special cases, where optimal information structures are monotone partitions (Sec-
tion 5). On the other hand, this requirement may reflect incentive and legal con-
straints faced by information designers. Monotone partitional information structures
are widespread and include, for example, school grades, tiered certification, credit
and consumer ratings.
2.4. Persuasion versus Delegation. We now show that implementable outcomes
differ in the persuasion and delegation problems with the same primitive (U, V ) ∈ P .
In the persuasion problem with U(θ, x) = −(θ−x)2, consider a monotone partition Π′
that reveals whether the state is above or below 1/3. Since θ is uniformly distributed
on [0, 1], the induced decision of the agent is
x∗P (θ,Π
′) =
{
1
6
, if θ ∈ (0, 1
3
)
,
2
3
, if θ ∈ (1
3
, 1
)
,
where 1/6 is the midpoint between 0 and 1/3, and 2/3 is the midpoint between 1/3
and 1.
This outcome cannot be implemented in the delegation problem with the same prim-
itive U(θ, x) = −(θ− x)2. To see this, consider a delegation set Π′′ that permits only
two decisions, 1/6 and 2/3. The induced decision of the agent is
x∗D(θ,Π
′′) =
{
1
6
, if θ ∈ (0, 5
12
)
,
2
3
, if θ ∈ ( 5
12
, 1
)
,
2Formally, state θ = 1 is separated, but this is immaterial, because this event has zero probability.
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where 5/12 is the midpoint between 1/6 and 2/3. Thus, the induced decisions in
the persuasion and delegation problems differ on the interval of intermediate states
between 1/3 and 5/12.3
Note that the outcome x∗P (·,Π′) is the first best for the principal whose payoff V (θ, x)
is maximized at x = 1/6 for states below 1/3 and is maximized at x = 2/3 for
states above 1/3. This first best is not implementable in the delegation problem
with the same primitive. Conversely, the outcome x∗D(·,Π′′) is the first best for the
principal whose payoff V (θ, x) is maximized at x = 1/6 for states below 5/12 and is
maximized at x = 2/3 for states above 5/12. This first best is not implementable in
the persuasion problem with the same primitive.4
3. Equivalence
3.1. Main Result. We use von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) notion of stra-
tegic equivalence. Primitives (UD, VD) ∈ P and (UP , VP ) ∈ P of the balanced delega-
tion and monotone persuasion problems are equivalent if there exist α > 0 and β ∈ R
such that
E
[
VD(θ, x
∗
D(θ,Π))
]
= αE
[
VP (θ, x
∗
P (θ,Π))
]
+ β for all Π ∈ Π.
That is, if (UD, VD) and (UP , VP ) are equivalent, then, in both problems, the prin-
cipal gets the same expected payoff, up to an affine transformation, for each Π;
consequently, the principal’s optimal solution is also the same.
Theorem 1. For each (UD, VD) ∈ P, an equivalent (UP , VP ) ∈ P is given by
UP (θ, x) = −
∫ x
0
∂UD(t, s)
∂s
∣∣∣∣
s=θ
dt and VP (θ, x) = −
∫ x
0
∂VD(t, s)
∂s
∣∣∣∣
s=θ
dt. (3a)
Conversely, for each (UP , VP ) ∈ P, an equivalent (UD, VD) ∈ P is given by
UD(θ, x) =
∫ 1
x
∂UP (s, t)
∂t
∣∣∣∣
t=θ
ds and VD(θ, x) =
∫ 1
x
∂VP (s, t)
∂t
∣∣∣∣
t=θ
ds. (3b)
Theorem 1 explicitly connects the two problems. In fact, we prove a stronger result
than Theorem 1. We show that if primitives (UD, VD) ∈ P and (UP , VP ) ∈ P satisfy
∂UD(θD, x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=θP
= − ∂UP (θP , x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=θD
and
∂VD(θD, x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=θP
= − ∂VP (θP , x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=θD
for all θD, θP ∈ [0, 1], then, in both problems, not only the principal but also the agent
gets the same ex-ante expected payoff, up to a constant, for each Π. This connection
equates the marginal payoffs from a decision and swaps the roles of decisions and
3Since the outcome x∗P (·,Π′) cannot be implemented in the delegation problem, it cannot be
implemented in the balanced delegation problem.
4Similarly, if the principal’s payoff V (θ, x) is maximized at decision 0 for states below 1/2 and is
maximized at decision 1 for states above 1/2, then the first best is implementable by the balanced
delegation set {0, 1}, but is not implementable by any monotone partition.
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states in the two problems. In particular, the agent’s payoff is supermodular in one
problem whenever it is concave in the decision in an equivalent problem.
The rest of this section proves the equivalence of the balanced delegation and mono-
tone persuasion problems, by showing that they are equivalent to a discriminatory
disclosure problem. In this problem, the agent is privately informed and has a binary
action. The principal designs a menu of cutoff tests, where a cutoff test discloses
whether the state is below or above a cutoff. The agent selects a test from the menu
and then chooses an action.
3.2. Discriminatory Disclosure Problem. The agent chooses between actions
a = 0 and a = 1. The agent’s payoff u(s, t) and principal’s payoff v(s, t) from a = 1
depend on a state s ∈ [0, 1] and an agent’s private type t ∈ [0, 1]; the payoffs from
a = 0 are normalized to zero. The state and type are independently and uniformly
distributed. We assume that:
(A′1) u(s, t) and v(s, t) are continuous in s and t;
(A′2) u(s, t) is strictly increasing in s and strictly decreasing in t.
A pair (u, v) that satisfies assumptions (A′1) and (A
′
2) is a primitive of this problem.
The principal designs a menu Π ∈ Π of cutoff tests. Each cutoff test y ∈ Π discloses
whether the state s is at least y. The agent knows his private type t, selects a cutoff
test y from the menu Π, observes the result of the selected test, and then chooses
between a = 0 and a = 1.
3.3. Equivalence to Balanced Delegation. Consider a discriminatory disclosure
problem with a primitive (u, v). A menu of cutoffs Π can be interpreted as a delegation
set, and the agent’s selection of a cutoff y ∈ Π as an agent’s decision. Indeed, by
(A′2), the agent gets a higher payoff from a = 1 when the state s is higher; so either
he optimally chooses a = 1 whenever s ≥ y, or makes a choice irrespective of the
test result. But ignoring the test result is the same as selecting an uninformative test
y ∈ {0, 1} ⊂ Π, and then choosing a = 1 whenever s ≥ y. Therefore, without loss of
generality, after observing the result of the selected test, s ≥ y or s < y, the agent
chooses a = 1 if s ≥ y and a = 0 if s < y.
Thus, the agent selects a test y ∈ Π that maximizes his expected payoff,
y∗(t,Π) = arg max
y∈Π
∫ 1
y
u(s, t)ds. (4a)
The principal’s objective is to maximize her expected payoff,
max
Π∈Π
E
[∫ 1
y∗(t,Π)
v(s, t)ds
]
. (4b)
By (A′2), y
∗(t,Π) is single-valued for almost all t, so E
[ ∫ 1
y∗(t,Π) v(s, t)ds
]
is well defined.
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The discriminatory disclosure problem (4a)–(4b) is a balanced delegation problem
(1a)–(1b) with
UD(θ, x) =
∫ 1
x
u(s, t)|t=θ ds and VD(θ, x) =
∫ 1
x
v(s, t)|t=θ ds.
Conversely, for (UD, VD) ∈ P , define (U¯D, V¯D) ∈ P by
U¯D(θ, x) = UD(θ, x)− UD(θ, 1) and V¯D(θ, x) = VD(θ, x)− VD(θ, 1).
Note that, for each Π, the principal gets the same expected payoff in the balanced
delegation problem with (UD, VD) and (U¯D, V¯D), up to a constant, E[VD(θ, 1)].
The balanced delegation problem (1a)–(1b) with primitive (U¯D, V¯D) is a discriminat-
ory disclosure problem (4a)–(4b) with
u(s, t) = −∂UD(t, s)
∂s
and v(s, t) = −∂VD(t, s)
∂s
.
Finally, (UD, VD) satisfies (A1)–(A2) if and only if (u, v) satisfies (A
′
1)–(A
′
2).
3.4. Equivalence to Monotone Persuasion. Consider a discriminatory disclosure
problem with a primitive (u, v). A menu Π ∈ Π defines a monotone partition of [0, 1].
The agent’s optimal choice between a = 0 and a = 1 is the same whether he observes
the partition element µΠ(s) or the result of the optimally selected cutoff test y ∈ Π.
Indeed, by (A′2), the agent gets a higher payoff from a = 1 when a partition element
is higher; so he optimally chooses a = 1 whenever the partition element is at least
y ∈ Π. Therefore, the agent behaves as if he observes the partition element µΠ(s)
that contains the state s.
Furthermore, by (A′2), the agent gets a higher expected payoff from a = 1 when
his type t is lower; so he optimally chooses a = 1 whenever t ≤ z for some z ∈
[0, 1]. Therefore, without loss of generality, after observing µΠ(s), the agent chooses
a threshold type z ∈ [0, 1], and then a = 1 if t ≤ z and a = 0 if t > z.
Thus, the agent chooses a threshold type z ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes his expected payoff
z∗(s,Π) = arg max
z∈[0,1]
E
[∫ z
0
u(s′, t)dt
∣∣∣∣ s′ ∈ µΠ(s)] . (5a)
The principal’s objective is to maximize her expected payoff,
max
Π∈Π
E
[∫ z∗(s,Π)
0
v(s, t)dt
]
. (5b)
By (A′2), z
∗(s,Π) is single-valued for all s, so E
[ ∫ z∗(s,Π)
0
v(s, t)dt
]
is well defined.
The discriminatory disclosure problem (5a)–(5b) is a monotone persuasion problem
(2a)–(2b) with
UP (θ, x) =
∫ x
0
u(s, t)|s=θ dt and VP (θ, x) =
∫ x
0
v(s, t)|s=θ dt.
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Conversely, for (UP , VP ) ∈ P , define (U¯P , V¯P ) ∈ P by
U¯P (θ, x) = UP (θ, x)− UP (θ, 0) and V¯P (θ, x) = VP (θ, x)− VP (θ, 0).
Note that, for each Π, the principal gets the same expected payoff in the monotone
persuasion problem with (UP , VP ) and (U¯P , V¯P ), up to a constant, E[VP (θ, 0)].
The monotone persuasion problem (2a)–(2b) with primitive (U¯P , V¯P ) is a discrimin-
atory disclosure problem (5a)–(5b) with
u(s, t) =
∂UP (s, t)
∂t
and v(s, t) =
∂VP (s, t)
∂t
.
Finally, (UP , VP ) satisfies (A1)–(A2) if and only if (u, v) satisfies (A
′
1)–(A
′
2).
4. Application to Monopoly Regulation
We consider the classical problem of monopoly regulation as in Baron and Myerson
(1982). The monopolist privately knows his cost and chooses a price to maximize
profit. The welfare-maximizing regulator can restrict the set of prices the monopol-
ist can choose from, for example, by imposing a price cap. Following Alonso and
Matouschek (2008), we assume that the demand function is linear and the marginal
cost has a unimodal distribution. Importantly, unlike in Baron and Myerson (1982),
transfers between the monopolist and regulator are prohibited.
We study two versions of this problem: (i) with the monopolist’s participation con-
straint, as in Baron and Myerson (1982) and Amador and Bagwell (2016), and (ii)
without any participation constraint, as in Alonso and Matouschek (2008). We for-
mulate both versions as balanced delegation problems. We then find the equivalent
monotone persuasion problems and solve them using a single result from the per-
suasion literature. We show that, in both versions, the welfare-maximizing regulator
imposes a price cap, which is higher when the participation constraint is present.
4.1. Setup. The demand function is q = 1 − x where x is the price and q is the
quantity demanded at this price. The cost of producing quantity q is γq. The marginal
cost γ ∈ [0, 1] has a distribution F that admits a strictly positive, continuous, and
unimodal density f .
The monopolist’s (agent’s) payoff is the profit
UD(γ, x) = (x− γ)(1− x).
The regulator’s (principal’s) payoff is the sum of the profit and consumer surplus,
VD(γ, x) = UD(γ, x) +
1
2
(1− x)2.
The regulator chooses a set of prices Π ⊂ [0, 1] available to the monopolist. The
monopolist privately observes the marginal cost γ and chooses a price x from Π to
maximize profit UD(γ, x).
                            11 / 36
 PERSUASION MEETS DELEGATION 11
We first assume that the monopolist cannot be forced to operate at a loss. Formally,
the monopolist can always choose to produce zero quantity, which is the same as
setting price x = 1; so 1 ∈ Π.
Notice that selling at zero price gives a lower profit than not producing at all, re-
gardless of the value of the marginal cost. Thus, allowing the price x = 0 does not
affect the monopolist’s behavior; so, without loss of generality, 0 ∈ Π. To sum up,
the regulator chooses a closed set of prices Π ⊂ [0, 1] that contains 0 and 1; so Π ∈ Π.
To interpret this problem as a balanced delegation problem defined in Section 2.2,
we change the variable θ = F (γ), so that θ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The
monopolist’s and regulator’s payoffs are now given by
UD(θ, x) = (x− F−1(θ))(1− x) and VD(θ, x) = UD(θ, x) + 12(1− x)2. (6)
4.2. Analysis. By Theorem 1, an equivalent primitive (UP , VP ) of the monotone
persuasion problem is given by5
UP (θ, x) = −
∫ x
0
(1 + F−1(t)− 2θ)dt =
∫ F−1(x)
0
(2θ − 1− γ)f(γ)dγ,
VP (θ, x) = −
∫ x
0
(F−1(t)− θ)dt =
∫ F−1(x)
0
(θ − γ)f(γ)dγ,
where the set of decisions is [0, 1], the set of states is [0, 1], and the state is uniformly
distributed. In this problem, the payoffs are linear in the state; so only the posterior
mean state matters. Under this assumption on the payoffs, optimal information
structures are characterized in the literature (Section 5.1). We now illustrate how
tools from this literature can address the monopoly regulation problem.
Let mΠ(θ) = E[θ′|θ′ ∈ µΠ(θ)] be the posterior mean state induced by a partition
element µΠ(θ) of a monotone partition Π. Since UP is linear in θ, the agent’s optimal
decision depends on µΠ(θ) only through mΠ(θ); so x
∗
P (θ,Π) = x¯
∗(mΠ(θ)) with
x¯∗(m) = arg max
x∈[0,1]
∫ F−1(x)
0
(2m− 1− γ)f(γ)dγ = F (2m− 1),
where, by convention, F (2m−1) = 0 if 2m−1 ≤ 0 and F (2m−1) = 1 if 2m−1 ≥ 1.
Since VP is linear in θ, the principal’s expected payoff given µΠ(θ) is a function ν that
depends on µΠ(θ) only through mΠ(θ):
ν(m) =
∫ F−1(x¯∗(m))
0
(m− γ)f(γ)dγ =
∫ 2m−1
0
(m− γ)f(γ)dγ. (7)
Thus, the principal’s objective is to maximize the expectation of ν,
max
Π∈Π
E
[
ν(mΠ(θ))
]
.
5In Appendix A.1, we provide an interpretation of this persuasion problem.
                            12 / 36
 12 KOLOTILIN AND ZAPECHELNYUK
1θ∗
ν(m)
separating pooling
1+θ∗
2 θ
∗∗
ν(m)
separating pooling
2+θ∗∗
21
(a) With Participation Constraint (b) Without Participation Constraint
Figure 1. Optimal Monotone Partitions
The curvature of ν determines the form of the optimal monotone partition. Because
the density f is unimodal, ν is S-shaped (see Figure 1(a)). Thus, the optimal mono-
tone partition is an upper-censorship: the states below a cutoff θ∗ are separated, and
the states above θ∗ are pooled and induce the posterior mean state equal to (1+θ∗)/2.
Proposition 1. Let γm ∈ (0, 1) be the mode of the density f . The set Π∗ = [0, θ∗]∪{1}
is optimal, where θ∗ ∈ (γm, (1 + γm)/2) is the unique solution to
ν
(
1 + θ∗
2
)
− ν (θ∗) =
(
1 + θ∗
2
− θ∗
)
ν ′
(
1 + θ∗
2
)
. (8)
Since upper censorship Π∗ = [0, θ∗] ∪ {1} is optimal in the monotone persuasion
problem, the same delegation set is optimal in the monopoly regulation problem.
That is, the regulator imposes the price cap θ∗, thus implementing the price function
x∗(γ) =

1+γ
2
, if γ < 2θ∗ − 1,
θ∗, if 2γ ∈ (θ∗ − 1, θ∗),
1, if γ > θ∗.
In words, the monopolist chooses not to participate if his marginal cost γ is above
the price cap θ∗. The participating monopolist chooses his preferred price (1 + γ)/2
if it is below the cap, and he chooses the cap otherwise.
4.3. Analysis without Participation Constraint. We now assume that the reg-
ulator can force the monopolist to operate even when making a loss. That is, the
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regulator can choose any set of prices, without an additional constraint to include the
price x = 1.
To interpret this problem as a balanced delegation problem defined in Section 2.2,
we observe that when the price x is sufficiently high or sufficiently low, both the
monopolist and regulator prefer intermediate prices. Thus, the requirement to include
sufficiently extreme prices into the delegation set is not binding.
Specifically, consider UD and VD given by (6) and defined on the domain of prices [0, 2].
The regulator chooses a closed delegation set Π ⊂ [0, 2]. Observe that, regardless of
the marginal cost γ ∈ [0, 1], the regulator’s payoff is negative if x > 1 and zero
if x = 1. Therefore, an optimal delegation set Π∗ must contain a price x0 ∈ [0, 1].
Moreover, the monopolist prefers x0 to 0 and to any price x ≥ 2. Therefore, Π∗∪{0, 2}
implements the same price function as Π∗.
We thus obtain a balanced delegation problem, up to rescaling of the monopolist’s de-
cision. Using Theorem 1, we find the equivalent primitive of the monotone persuasion
problem.
For comparability, it is convenient to rescale the state in the monotone persuasion
problem, so that it is uniformly distributed on [0, 2]. Analogously to Section 4.2,
the principal’s objective now is to choose a monotone partition Π ⊂ [0, 2] such that
{0, 2} ∈ Π to maximize the expectation of ν given by (7) defined on [0, 2]. Because
ν is still S-shaped (see Figure 1(b)), the optimal monotone partition is an upper-
censorship: the states below a cutoff θ∗∗ are separated, and the states above θ∗∗ are
pooled and induce the posterior mean state equal to (2 + θ∗∗)/2.
Proposition 1′. Let γm ∈ (0, 1) be the mode of the density f . The set Π∗∗ =
[0, θ∗∗] ∪ {2} is optimal, where θ∗∗ ∈ (0, (1 + γm)/2) is the unique solution to
ν
(
2 + θ∗∗
2
)
− ν (θ∗∗) =
(
2 + θ∗∗
2
− θ∗∗
)
ν ′
(
2 + θ∗∗
2
)
. (9)
Proposition 1′ implies that [0, θ∗∗] is the optimal delegation set in the monopoly reg-
ulation problem without the participation constraint. That is, the regulator imposes
the price cap θ∗∗, thus implementing the price function
x∗∗(γ) =
{
1+γ
2
, if γ < 2θ∗∗ − 1,
θ∗∗, if γ > 2θ∗∗ − 1.
In words, the monopolist chooses his preferred price (1 + γ)/2 if it is below the price
cap, and he chooses the cap otherwise.
4.4. Discussion. The optimal regulation policy takes the form of a price cap, re-
gardless of whether the monopolist’s participation constraint is present. However,
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the optimal price cap is higher when the participation constraint is present, as fol-
lows from Propositions 1 and 1′. Indeed, since ν is concave on [(1 + γm)/2, 2] and
1 + γm
2
<
1 + θ∗
2
< 1 <
2 + θ∗∗
2
< 2,
the slope of ν is higher at (1 + θ∗)/2 than at (2 + θ∗∗)/2; so (8) and (9) imply that
θ∗ > θ∗∗ (see Figures 1(a) and 1(b)).
We now build the intuition for why the optimal price cap is higher when the parti-
cipation constraint is present. The first-order condition (8) for the optimal price cap
θ∗ can be written as ∫ θ∗
2θ∗−1
(θ∗ − γ)f(γ)dγ = 1
2
(1− θ∗)2f(θ∗), (8′)
where the left-hand side and right-hand side correspond to the regulator’s marginal
gain and marginal loss of decreasing the price cap by dθ. The gain is that the
monopolist with the cost γ ∈ (2θ∗ − 1, θ∗) now chooses the decreased price cap
θ∗ − dθ, which is closer to his cost γ. The loss is that the monopolist with the cost
γ ∈ (θ∗ − dθ, θ∗) now chooses to exit.
Instead, if the regulator does not take into account that the monopolist with the cost
higher than the price cap exits, then the first-order condition (9) for the price cap θ∗∗
can be written as ∫ θ∗∗
2θ∗∗−1
(θ∗∗ − γ)f(γ)dγ =
∫ 1
θ∗∗
(γ − θ∗∗)f(γ)dγ. (9′)
The regulator’s marginal gain here is the same. But the marginal loss is that the
monopolist with the cost γ ∈ (θ∗∗, 1) chooses the decreased price cap θ∗∗ − dθ, which
is further from his cost γ.
Intuitively, the marginal loss in (8′) is higher than in (9′), because all surplus is lost
if the monopolist exits, but only a part of surplus is lost if the monopolist sets the
price further away from his cost.6 This suggests that the regulator should give more
discretion to the monopolist when she is concerned that the monopolist can exit.
5. Linear Delegation and Linear Persuasion
5.1. Setup. Consider a primitive (UD, VD) ∈ P of the balanced delegation problem
that satisfies
∂UD(θ, x)
∂x
= b(θ)− c(x) and ∂VD(θ, x)
∂x
= d(θ)− c(x), (10)
6The right-hand side of (8′) can be expressed as
∫ 1
θ∗(γ − θ∗)f(θ∗)dγ. This marginal loss is higher
than in (9′), because f(θ∗) > f(γ) for γ > θ∗ > γm by the unimodality of f .
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where b, c, and d are continuous, and b and c are strictly increasing. By Theorem 1,
for each (UD, VD) ∈ P that satisfies (10), an equivalent primitive (UP , VP ) ∈ P of the
monotone persuasion problem satisfies
∂UP (θ, x)
∂x
= c(θ)− b(x) and ∂VP (θ, x)
∂x
= c(θ)− d(x). (11)
Conversely, for each (UP , VP ) ∈ P that satisfies (11), an equivalent primitive (UD, VD) ∈
P of the balanced delegation problem satisfies (10).
We call (UD, VD) and (UP , VP ) that satisfy (10) and (11) linear, because the marginal
payoffs from a decision are linear, respectively, in a transformation of the decision,
c(x), and in a transformation of the state, c(θ).
Linear delegation (albeit without the inclusion of the extreme decisions) has been
studied by Holmstro¨m (1984), Melumad and Shibano (1991), Martimort and Semenov
(2006), Alonso and Matouschek (2008), Goltsman, Ho¨rner, Pavlov, and Squintani
(2009), Kova´cˇ and Mylovanov (2009), Amador and Bagwell (2013), and Amador,
Bagwell, and Frankel (2018).7
Linear persuasion (albeit without the restriction to monotone partitions) has been
studied by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016), Kolo-
tilin, Mylovanov, Zapechelnyuk, and Li (2017), Kolotilin (2018), and Dworczak and
Martini (2019).8
It is convenient to represent a linear monotone persuasion problem as
max
Π∈Π
E
[
ν(mΠ(θ))
]
, (12)
for some function ν, where mΠ(θ) = E[c(θ′)|θ′ ∈ µΠ(θ)]. We can derive ν from
(UP , VP ) as follows. Since UP is linear in c(θ), the agent’s optimal decision depends
on µΠ(θ) only through mΠ(θ); so x
∗
P (θ,Π) = x¯
∗(mΠ(θ)). Moreover, since VP is linear
in c(θ), the principal’s expected payoff is a function ν that depends on µΠ(θ) only
through mΠ(θ),
ν(m) = VP (m, x¯
∗(m)).
Conversely, for each function ν, a monotone persuasion problem reduces to (12) if
(UP , VP ) satisfies (11) with b(x) = x, c(θ) = θ, and d(x) = −ν ′(x).
7Amador and Bagwell (2016) study linear delegation with a participation constraint. Despite
the same assumptions on the payoffs, linear delegation is conceptually different from veto-based
delegation of Krishna and Morgan (2001), Dessein (2002), and Mylovanov (2008) and from limited-
commitment delegation of Kolotilin, Li, and Li (2013).
8Dworczak and Martini (2019) and Kolotilin and Li (2019) study linear monotone persuasion.
Dworczak and Martini (2019) provide conditions under which monotone partitions are optimal
among all information structures. Kolotilin and Li (2019) characterize optimal monotone parti-
tions when they differ from optimal information structures.
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5.2. Optimal Linear Delegation. We now generalize and extend the existing res-
ults in the literature on linear delegation, using the tools from the literature on linear
persuasion (Kolotilin, 2018, and Dworczak and Martini, 2019).
We consider a linear delegation problem where the agent’s and principal’s payoffs are
given by (10), the set of states is a compact interval, and the set of decisions is the real
line. Without loss of generality, we rescale the state and decision so that b(θ) = θ,
where the state θ ∈ [0, 1] has a distribution F that admits a strictly positive and
continuous density f . For the problem to be well defined, we assume that there exist
the agent’s and principal’s preferred decisions for each state. Specifically, we assume
that there exist x′, x′′ ∈ R such that c(x′) ≤ θ ≤ c(x′′) and c(x′) ≤ d(θ) ≤ c(x′′) for
all θ.
In this problem, the principal chooses a compact subset Π ⊂ R to maximize her
expected payoff,
max
Π∈Π(R)
E
[
VD(θ, x
∗
D(θ,Π))
]
,
where Π(R) is the set of all compact subsets of R. As we show in Appendix A.3,
this problem can be formulated as a balanced delegation problem with a sufficiently
large compact set of decisions [y, y]. Notice that the decision is rescaled so that the
principal chooses Π ∈ Π([y, y]) where
Π([y, y]) = {Π ⊂ [y, y] : Π is closed and {y, y} ⊂ Π}. (13)
By Theorem 1, an equivalent primitive (UP , VP ) of the monotone persuasion problem
is given by
UP (θ, x) =
∫ F−1(x)
0
(c(θ)− t)f(t)dt and VP (θ, x) =
∫ F−1(x)
0
(c(θ)− d(t))f(t)dt,
where the set of decisions is [0, 1], the set of states is [y, y], and the state is uniformly
distributed. Notice that the state is rescaled so that the principal chooses a monotone
partition Π ∈ Π([y, y]).
Since UP is linear in c(θ), the agent’s optimal decision depends on µΠ(θ) only through
mΠ(θ) = E[c(θ′)|θ′ ∈ µΠ(θ)] =
{c(θ)}, if pi(θ) = pi(θ),∫ pi(θ)pi(θ) c(θ′)dθ′
pi(θ)−pi(θ) , if pi(θ) < pi(θ),
where pi(θ) and pi(θ) are defined in Section 2.3; so x∗P (θ,Π) = x¯
∗(mΠ(θ)) with
x¯∗(m) = arg max
x∈[0,1]
∫ F−1(x)
0
(m− t)f(t)dt = F (m),
where, by convention, F (m) = 0 if m ≤ 0 and F (m) = 1 if m ≥ 1.
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1
c(x∗)0
ν(m)
pΠ∗(m)
1c(x∗H)0
ν(m)
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∗
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pΠ∗(m)
c(x∗H) 1m
∗
(a) Part 1 (b) Part 2 (c) Part 3
Figure 2. Three Parts in Proposition 2
Since VP is linear in c(θ), the principal’s expected payoff given µΠ(θ) is a function ν
that depends on µΠ(θ) only through mΠ(θ),
ν(m) =
∫ F−1(x¯∗(m))
0
(m− d(t))f(t)dt =
∫ m
0
(m− d(t))f(t)dt. (14)
The next theorem verifies whether a candidate delegation set is optimal.
Theorem 2. Π∗ ∈ Π([y, y]) is optimal if pΠ∗(m) is convex and pΠ∗(m) ≥ ν(m) for
all m ∈ c([y, y]), where, for all s ∈ [y, y],
pΠ∗(c(s)) = ν(mΠ∗(s)) + ν
′(mΠ∗(s))(c(s)−mΠ∗(s)).
Proof. Consider any Π ∈ Π([y, y]). The theorem follows from
E[ν(mΠ∗(s))]− E[ν(mΠ(s))] = E[pΠ∗(c(s))]− E[ν(mΠ(s))]
≥ E[pΠ∗(c(s))]− E[pΠ∗(mΠ(s))]
= E[E[pΠ∗(c(s′))]− pΠ∗(mΠ(s))|s′ ∈ µΠ(s)]] ≥ 0,
where the first equality holds by definition of pΠ∗ , the first inequality holds by pΠ∗ ≥
ν, the second equality holds by the law of iterated expectations, and the second
inequality holds by Jensen’s inequality applied to convex pΠ∗ . 
Using Theorem 2, we find sufficient conditions under which one- or two-interval del-
egation sets are optimal (see Figure 2).
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Proposition 2.
1. A delegation set {x∗} is optimal if
ν(m) ≤ 0 for all m ≤ c(x∗),
ν(m) ≤ ν(1) +m− 1 for all m ≥ c(x∗),
ν(1) + c(x∗)− 1 = 0.
2. A delegation set [x∗L, x
∗
H ] with x
∗
L < x
∗
H is optimal if
ν(m) is convex on [c(x∗L), c(x
∗
H)],
ν(m) ≤ 0 for all m ≤ c(x∗L) with equality at m = c(x∗L),
ν(m) ≤ ν(1) +m− 1 for all m ≥ c(x∗H) with equality at m = c(x∗H),
ν ′(0+) ≥ 0 if c(x∗L) = 0 and ν ′(1−) ≤ 1 if c(x∗H) = 1.
3. A delegation set (−∞, x∗L] ∪ [x∗H ,∞) with x∗L < x∗H is optimal if 9
ν(m) is convex on (−∞, c(x∗L)] and on [c(x∗H),∞),
ν(m) ≤ ν(m∗) + ν ′(m∗)(m−m∗) for all m ∈ [c(x∗L), c(x∗H)]
with equality at m = c(x∗L) and m = c(x
∗
H),
ν ′(m∗) ≥ 0 if c(x∗L) = 0 and ν ′(m∗) ≤ 1 if c(x∗H) = 1.
where
m∗ =
1
x∗H − x∗L
∫ x∗H
x∗L
c(s)ds.
The literature on linear delegation has focused on characterizing sufficient conditions
for interval delegation to be optimal. The conditions in Amador and Bagwell (2013,
Proposition 1) coincide with those in Proposition 2 (part 2), but we impose weaker
regularity assumptions on the primitives. Amador and Bagwell (2013, Proposition 2)
show that these conditions are also necessary.10
The sufficient conditions in Amador, Bagwell, and Frankel (2018, Proposition 1) for
degenerate interval delegation to be optimal coincide with those in Proposition 2 (part
1), but again we impose weaker regularity assumptions on the primitives. Alonso and
Matouschek (2008, Proposition 1) show that these conditions are also necessary.11
9The set of the agent’s preferred decisions is [c−1(0), c−1(1)]. Thus, delegation set (−∞, x∗L] ∪
[x∗H ,∞) implements the same outcome as set [y∗L, x∗L] ∪ [x∗H , y∗H ] does where y∗L = min{x∗L, c−1(0)}
and y∗H = max{x∗H , c−1(1)}.
10Alonso and Matouschek (2008, Propositions 3, 6, 7) also show the necessity and sufficiency of
these conditions but only for quadratic payoffs (c(x) = x).
11They show the necessity only for quadratic payoffs (c(x) = x), but we can use their argument to
show the necessity for non-quadratic payoffs. To this end, suppose first that there exists m′ < c(x∗)
such that ν(m′) > 0 and let x′ < x∗ be such that
∫ x∗
x′ c(s)ds = (x
∗−x′)m′. The principal’s expected
payoff is larger by (x∗ − x′)ν(m′) > 0 for delegation set {x′, x∗} than for {x∗}. The case in which
there exists m′ > c(x∗) such that ν(m′) > ν(1) +m′ − 1 is similar and omitted.
                            19 / 36
 PERSUASION MEETS DELEGATION 19
The sufficient conditions in Proposition 2 (part 3) for two-interval delegation to be
optimal are novel. This result implies Melumad and Shibano (1991, Proposition 4)
and Alonso and Matouschek (2008, Result 6).
Using Proposition 2, we now characterize optimal delegation sets in prominent cases.
Proposition 3.
1 (convex). If ν(m) is convex on [0, 1], then there exist x∗L ≤ x∗H such that delegation
set [x∗L, x
∗
H ] is optimal.
2 (concave). If ν(m) is concave on [0, 1], then there exist x∗L ≤ x∗H such that delegation
set {x∗L, x∗H} is optimal.
3 (convex-concave). If ν(m) is convex on [0, m˜] and concave on [m˜, 1] for some
0 < m˜ < 1, then there exist x∗L ≤ x∗M ≤ x∗H such that delegation set [x∗L, x∗M ] ∪ {x∗H}
is optimal.
4 (concave-convex). If ν(m) is concave on [0, m˜] and convex on [m˜, 1] for some
0 < m˜ < 1, then there exist x∗L ≤ x∗M ≤ x∗H such that delegation set {x∗L} ∪ [x∗M , x∗H ]
is optimal.
Amador, Bagwell, and Frankel (2018, Proposition 2) coincides with Proposition 3
(part 1), but again we impose weaker regularity assumptions on the primitives. Mar-
timort and Semenov (2006) assume that d(x) = x+ δ and f(θ)− δf ′(θ) ≥ 0, so that
ν is convex on [0, 1].
Parts 2–4 in Proposition 3 are novel. Melumad and Shibano (1991) assume uniform
density f(θ) = 1 and constant slope d′(x) = k > 0, so that ν is convex on [0, 1] if
k < 2 and concave on [0, 1] if k > 2. In the monopoly regulation problem of Section 4,
ν is convex-concave on [0, 1] because f is unimodal, but ν would be concave-convex
on [0, 1] if f was uniantimodal.
Finally, we comment on the limits of the tools from the persuasion literature for the
delegation problem. The persuasion literature studies optimal information structures
without the restriction to monotone partitions. Under the conditions in Theorem 2,
the set Π is optimal among all information structures. These conditions are not ne-
cessary, because Π may be optimal among monotone partitions, but not among all
information structures. However, as shown by Dworczak and Martini (2019, The-
orem 3), these conditions become necessary if ν is affine-closed (intuitively, if it has
at most one interior peak). Even when optimal information structures are not mono-
tone partitions, it may be possible to characterize optimal monotone partitions using
tools from Kolotilin and Li (2019).
5.3. Optimal Linear Delegation with Participation Constraint. We now con-
sider a linear delegation problem from Section 5.2 with the only difference that the
set of decisions is [x0,∞) and the decision x0 must always be permitted by the prin-
cipal. We assume that c(x0) ≤ 0 and that there exists x′′ > x0 such that θ ≤ c(x′′)
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and d(θ) ≤ c(x′′) for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. As follows from Appendix A.3, this problem can
be formulated as a balanced delegation problem with a sufficiently large compact set
of decisions [x0, y]. That is, the principal chooses Π ∈ Π([x0, y]) to maximize the
expectation of ν given by (14). Thus, Theorem 2 continues to hold with y = x0.
As an illustration, we use Theorem 2 to find sufficient conditions under which an
optimal delegation set takes the form of a floor on the decisions.
Proposition 2′. A delegation set {x0} ∪ [x∗,∞) with x∗ ≥ x0 is optimal if
ν(m) is convex on [c(x∗),∞),
ν(m) ≤ ν(m∗) + ν ′(m∗)(m−m∗) for all m ∈ [c(x0), c(x∗)] with equality at m = c(x∗),
ν ′(0+) ≥ 0 if c(x∗) = 0 and ν ′(1−) ≤ 1 if c(x∗) = 1,
where
m∗ =
{
c(x0), if x
∗ = x0,
1
x∗−x0
∫ x∗
x0
c(s)ds, if x∗ > x0.
Proposition 2′ can be used to derive conditions for a price cap (equivalently, a quantity
floor) to be optimal in a monopoly regulation problem of Section 4 with more general
primitives specified as follows. The inverse demand function is P (q). The marginal
cost γ ∈ [γ, γ], with 0 ≤ γ < γ < ∞, has a strictly positive and continuous density.
The regulator’s payoff is a weighted sum, with weights λ ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − λ, of the
profit and consumer surplus,
V (γ, q) = λ(P (q)− γ)q + (1− λ)
(∫ q
0
P (s)ds− P (q)q
)
.
We assume that the monopolist can always choose to produce zero quantity (exit).
The regulator’s problem reduces to a balanced delegation problem in which the reg-
ulator chooses a set of quantities Π ∈ Π([0, q]), where P (q) ≤ γ, available to the
monopolist. Up to rescaling of the state and decision, all assumptions imposed in
this section are satisfied in each of the following three cases:
1. P (q) = A−B ln q with A ∈ R and B > 0;
2. P (q) = A−BqC with A > 0, B > 0, and C > 0;
3. P (q) = A−BqC with A < γ, B < 0, and C ∈ (−1, 0).
For each of these cases, Proposition 2′ gives sufficient conditions on the cost distribu-
tion, demand parameters, and payoff weights for price-cap regulation to be optimal.
These conditions can be compared with those in Amador and Bagwell (2016) who
consider a similar setting but focus on delegation sets under which the monopolist
never chooses to exit.
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6. General Equivalence
We now generalize Theorem 1. We assume that the marginal payoffs are integrable
and single crossing, rather than continuous and monotone. We then discuss how this
result can be used to deal with arbitrary distributions of the state, which may have
atoms and zero density.
6.1. Primitives. We first define single crossing properties. A function φ(yi, y−i)
satisfies
(i) upcrossing in yi if, for each y−i,
φ(y′i, y−i) ≥ (>) 0 =⇒ φ(y′′i , y−i) ≥ (>) 0 whenever y′′i > y′i;
(ii) aggregate upcrossing in yi if, for each distribution H of y−i,∫
φ(y′i, y−i)dH(y−i) ≥ (>) 0 =⇒
∫
φ(y′′i , y−i)dH(y−i) ≥ (>) 0 whenever y′′i > y′i;
(iii) downcrossing (aggregate downcrossing) in yi if −φ(yi, y−i) satisfies upcrossing
(aggregate upcrossing) in yi.
12
The agent’s payoff U(θ, x) and the principal’s payoff V (θ, x) depend on a decision
x ∈ [0, 1] and a state θ ∈ [0, 1]. The state is uniformly distributed. We assume that
(A¯1) U(θ, x) and V (θ, x) are absolutely continuous in x;
∂
∂x
U(θ, x) and ∂
∂x
V (θ, x) are
integrable in θ.
In addition, for the balanced delegation problem, we assume that
(A¯D2 )
∂
∂x
U(θ, x) satisfies downcrossing in x and aggregate upcrossing in θ;
for the monotone persuasion problem, we assume that
(A¯P2 )
∂
∂x
U(θ, x) satisfies upcrossing in θ and aggregate downcrossing in x.
The balanced delegation and monotone persuasion problems are defined as in Section
2. But, unlike in Section 2, the agent’s optimal correspondences x∗D(θ,Π) and x
∗
P (θ,Π)
may not be single-valued. Depending on which optimal decisions are selected by the
agent, the principal can obtain different expected payoffs. Denote by
E
[
VD(θ, x
∗
D(θ,Π))
]
and E
[
VP (θ, x
∗
P (θ,Π))
]
the sets of the principal’s expected payoffs resulting from all integrable selections from
the correspondences x∗D(θ,Π) and x
∗
P (θ,Π) (Aumann, 1965).
12Quah and Strulovici (2012) characterize conditions for aggregate single crossing. In particular,
φ(yi, y−i) satisfies aggregate single crossing in yi if φ(yi, y−i) is monotone in yi.
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6.2. Equivalence. Let P¯D be the set of all primitives (UD, VD) that satisfy assump-
tions (A¯1) and (A¯
D
2 ), and let P¯P be the set of all primitives (UP , VP ) that satisfy
assumptions (A¯1) and (A¯
P
2 ).
Primitives (UD, VD) ∈ P¯D and (UP , VP ) ∈ P¯P are equivalent if there exist α > 0 and
β ∈ R such that
E
[
VD(θ, x
∗
D(θ,Π))
]
= αE
[
VP (θ, x
∗
P (θ,Π))
]
+ β for all Π ∈ Π.
That is, if (UD, VD) and (UP , VP ) are equivalent, then, in both problems, the principal
gets the same sets of expected payoffs, up to an affine transformation, for each Π.
Theorem 1′. For each (UD, VD) ∈ P¯D, an equivalent (UP , VP ) ∈ P¯P is given by (3a).
Conversely, for each (UP , VP ) ∈ P¯P , an equivalent (UD, VD) ∈ P¯D is given by (3b).
The principal’s set of expected payoffs is a singleton for each Π (and thus the prin-
cipal’s maximization problem is well defined) if the optimal correspondence is single-
valued for almost all θ. This property holds in the delegation problem if ∂
∂x
UD(θ, x)
satisfies strict aggregate upcrossing in θ. Similarly, this property holds in the persua-
sion problem if ∂
∂x
UP (θ, x) satisfies strict aggregate downcrossing in x.
Alternatively, the principal’s maximization problem can be defined by specifying a
selection rule from the agent’s optimal correspondence, such as the max rule (where
the agent chooses the principal’s most preferred decision) or the min rule (where the
agent chooses the principal’s least preferred decision).
6.3. General Distributions. Consider a balanced delegation or monotone persua-
sion problem with the state ω ∈ [ω, ω] that has a distribution F (possibly, with atoms
and zero density). To apply Theorem 1′, we redefine the state to be θ uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, 1], and define ω = F−1(θ), where F−1(θ) = inf{ω ∈ [ω, ω] : θ ≤ F (ω)}
is the quantile function.
With this change of variable, atoms in F translate into intervals where ∂
∂x
U(F−1(θ), x)
and ∂
∂x
V (F−1(θ), x) are constant in θ; zero-density intervals in F translate into points
where ∂
∂x
UD(F
−1(θ), x) and ∂
∂x
VD(F
−1(θ), x) have simple discontinuities in θ. This
change of variable preserves both integrability in θ assumed in (A¯1) and single-crossing
in θ assumed in (A¯D2 )/(A¯
P
2 ).
For the case of atomless distributions with a strictly positive density, Theorem 1′ can
be conveniently expressed as follows. Let UD(ωD, x) and VD(ωD, x) satisfy assump-
tions (A¯1) and (A¯
D
2 ), and let UP (ωP , x) and VP (ωP , x) satisfy assumptions (A¯1) and
(A¯P2 ). Suppose that ωD ∈ [0, 1] and ωP ∈ [0, 1] are distributed with strictly positive
densities fD and fP . Applying Theorem 1
′ to the primitives with redefined states,
and changing states back to ωD and ωP , we obtain that (UD, VD) and (UP , VP ) are
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equivalent if, for all ωD, ωP ∈ [0, 1],
∂UD(ωD, x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=ωP
fD(ωD) = − ∂UP (ωP , x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=ωD
fP (ωP ),
∂VD(ωD, x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=ωP
fD(ωD) = − ∂VP (ωP , x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=ωD
fP (ωP ).
To illustrate how Theorem 1′ applies when F has atoms, consider the example in
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011, p. 2591) in which a prosecutor (principal) persuades
a judge (agent) to convict a suspect. The suspect is innocent (ω = 0) with probability
0.7 and guilty (ω = 1) with probability 0.3, so that the distribution of ω is
F (ω) =
{
0.7, if ω ∈ [0, 1),
1, if ω = 1.
The prosecutor’s preferred decision is to convict the suspect irrespective of the state,
whereas the judge’s preferred decision is to convict the suspect whenever his posterior
that the suspect is guilty is at least 1/2,
VP (ω, x) = x and UP (ω, x) = (ω − 1/2)x,
where ω, x ∈ [0, 1]. Substituting ω = F−1(θ) yields
VP (θ, x) = x and UP (θ, x) =
{
−x/2, if θ ∈ [0, 0.7),
x/2, if θ ∈ [0.7, 1].
Clearly, (UP , VP ) ∈ P¯P . By Theorem 1′, an equivalent primitive (UD, VD) ∈ P¯D of
the balanced delegation problem is given by
VD(θ, x) = 1− x and UD(θ, x) =
{
(x− 0.4)/2, if x ∈ [0, 0.7),
(1− x)/2, if x ∈ [0.7, 1].
Assume that the agent breaks ties in favor of the principal. It is easy to see that the
optimal balanced delegation set is Π∗ = {0, 0.4, 1}, so that the agent is indifferent
between x = 0.4 and x = 1 and thus chooses the principal’s preferred decision,
x∗ = 0.4. The principal’s optimal expected payoff is 1− x∗ = 0.6.
Let us interpret the solution Π∗ = {0, 0.4, 1} within the persuasion problem. When
the state θ belongs to the partition element [0, 0.4), the posterior is that ω = F−1(θ) =
0 with probability one, so the judge acquits the suspect. When the state θ belongs to
the partition element [0.4, 1), the posterior is that ω = F−1(θ) = 0 with probability
1/2, when θ ∈ [0.4, 0.7), and ω = F−1(θ) = 1 with probability 1/2, when θ ∈ [0.7, 1).
So, the judge is indifferent between convicting and acquiting, and thus convicts the
suspect. The prosecutor’s expected payoff is 0.6, and Π∗ is the optimal information
structure derived in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011, p. 2591).
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7. Concluding Remarks
We have shown the equivalence of balanced delegation and monotone persuasion,
with the upshot that insights in delegation can be used for better understanding of
persuasion, and vice versa. For instance, persuasion as the design of a distribution
of posterior beliefs is notoriously hard to explain to a non-specialized audience. The
connection to delegation can thus be instrumental in relaying technical results from
the persuasion literature to practitioners and policy makers.
We have used the tools from the literature on linear persuasion to obtain new res-
ults on linear delegation. Amador and Bagwell (2013) have developed a Lagrangian
method to derive sufficient conditions for the optimality of interval delegation in a
nonlinear delegation problem. This method may be useful for deriving conditions for
the optimality of interval persuasion in an equivalent nonlinear persuasion problem.
The classical delegation and persuasion problems have numerous extensions, which in-
clude a privately informed principal, competing principals, multiple agents, repeated
interactions, and multidimensional state and decision spaces. We hope that our equi-
valence result will be a starting point for studying the connection between delegation
and persuasion in these extensions.
It may be interesting to compare the values of delegation and persuasion in a given
problem. This comparison can be made by recasting the persuasion problem as an
equivalent delegation problem and then directly comparing the solutions and values
of these two delegation problems.
Naturally, a principal may wish to influence an agent’s decision by a combination of
persuasion and delegation instruments. How to optimally control both information
and decisions of the agent, how these instruments interact, and whether they are
substitutes or complements are important questions that are left for future research.
Appendix
A.1. Interpretation of Persuasion Problem. In Section 4, we have expressed
the monopoly regulation problem as a balanced delegation problem and derived an
equivalent monotone persuasion problem. The primitive of this problem, up to a
multiplicative constant, is
UP (θ, x) =
1
2
∫ x
0
(2θ − 1− F−1(γ))dγ and VP (θ, x) =
∫ x
0
(θ − F−1(γ))dγ. (15)
We now provide an interpretation of this problem.
A producer (agent) chooses a quantity x to produce. He faces uncertainty about an
exogenous price θ that is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The producer’s payoff is
UP (θ, x) = θx− C(x), (16)
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where C(x) is the producer’s cost function. A government agency (principal) can
disclose information about the price to the producer. The agency’s payoff is
VD(θ, x) = θx−D(x), (17)
where isD(x) is the social cost function. The difference, C(x)−D(x), is the producer’s
externality. The agency chooses Π ∈ Π. The producer observes the partition element
µΠ(θ) that contains the price θ and chooses a quantity x that maximizes his expected
payoff given the posterior belief about the price.
Observe that the payoffs (16)–(17) are the same as (15) if
C(x) =
∫ x
0
1 + F−1(γ)
2
dγ and D(x) =
∫ x
0
F−1(γ)dγ.
Both cost functions C and D are convex, since F−1 is increasing. Notice that C(x)−
D(x) > 0 for all x > 0. So, in this problem, we have a positive externality, where the
social cost is smaller than the producer’s cost.
A.2. Proof of Propositions 1 and 1′. The derivative of ν(m) is
ν ′(m) = 2(1−m)f(2m− 1) +
∫ 2m−1
0
f(γ)dγ.
First, we show that ν(m) is S-shaped (that is, ν ′ is single-peaked with an interior
peak) when the density f is unimodal.
Lemma 1. Let γm ∈ (0, 1) be the mode of the density f . Then, ν(m) is convex on
(−∞, (1 + γm)/2] (strictly so on [1/2, (1 + γm)/2]) and concave on [(1 + γm)/2,∞)
(strictly so on [(1 + γm)/2, 1]).
Proof. For any m1,m2,
ν ′(m2)− ν ′(m1) = 2(1−m2)[f(2m2 − 1)− f(2m1 − 1)]
+
∫ 2m2−1
2m1−1
[f(γ)− f(2m1 − 1)]dγ.
Thus, if m1 < m2 ≤ (1 + γm)/2, then ν ′(m2) ≥ ν ′(m1), because f(2m − 1) is
increasing for m ∈ (−∞, (1+γm)/2]. Moreover, if 1/2 ≤ m1 < m2 ≤ (1+γm)/2, then
ν ′(m2) > ν ′(m1), because f(2m − 1) is strictly increasing for m ∈ [1/2, (1 + γm)/2].
Similarly, if (1 + γm)/2 ≤ m1 < m2, then ν ′(m2) ≤ ν ′(m1), because f(2m − 1) is
decreasing for m ∈ [(1 + γm)/2,∞). Moreover, if (1 + γm)/2 ≤ m1 < m2 ≤ 1, then
ν ′(m2) < ν ′(m1), because f(2m− 1) is strictly decreasing for m ∈ [(1 + γm)/2, 1]. 
Propositions 1 and 1′ are special cases of Lemma 2.
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Lemma 2. Let γm ∈ (0, 1) be the mode of the density f , and let θ be uniformly
distributed on [0, θ] with θ ≥ 1. The set Π? = [0, θ?] ∪ {θ} is optimal, where θ? ∈(
max
{
0, 1 + γm − θ
}
, (1 + γm)/2
)
is the unique solution to
ν
(
θ + θ?
2
)
− ν (θ?) =
(
θ + θ?
2
− θ?
)
ν ′
(
θ + θ?
2
)
. (18)
Proof. It is straightforward to show (see Figures 1(a) and 1(b)) that there exists a
unique solution θ? to (18) with
1− E[θ] ≤ θ? < 1 + γm
2
<
θ + θ?
2
.
We now use Theorem 2 in Section 5 to verify that Π? is optimal. For Π? = [0, θ?]∪{θ},
we have
pΠ?(m) =
{
ν(m), if m < θ?,
ν
(
θ+θ?
2
)
+
(
m− θ+θ?
2
)
ν ′
(
θ+θ?
2
)
, if m ≥ θ?.
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show pΠ? as a dashed red curve. It is straightforward to verify
that pΠ?(m) is convex and pΠ?(m) ≥ ν(m) for all m ∈ [0, θ]. Thus, Π? is optimal by
Theorem 2. 
A.3. Standard Delegation. Consider a delegation problem in which the set of
states is Θ = [θ, θ] and the set of decisions is the real line. The principal chooses
Π ∈ Π(R), where Π(R) is the set of all compact subsets of R. Payoffs UD and VD
satisfy assumptions (A¯1) and (A¯
D
2 ). In addition, we assume that
(A¯3) sup
θ∈Θ
UD(θ, x)→ −∞ and sup
θ∈Θ
VD(θ, x)→ −∞ as x→ ±∞.
Note that (A¯1), (A¯
D
2 ), and (A¯3) are satisfied in the linear delegation problem in
Section 5.
We now show that this problem can be formulated as a balanced delegation problem,
up to rescaling of the decision, in which the principal chooses Π ∈ Π([y, y]) given by
(13) for a sufficiently large compact set [y, y].
Lemma 3. There exists an interval [x, x] such that, for each y < x and each y > x,
max
Π∈Π([y,y])
E
[
VD(θ, x
∗
D(θ,Π))
]
= max
Π∈Π(R)
E
[
VD(θ, x
∗
D(θ,Π))
]
.
Proof. Consider z0 ∈ R. Let V0 be the principal’s expected payoff if Π = {z0},
V0 = E[VD(θ, z0)].
Let
Z =
{
x ∈ R : sup
θ∈Θ
VD(θ, x) ≥ V0
}
.
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Note that Z is nonempty because z0 ∈ Z, and it is bounded by (A¯3). Let z = inf Z
and z = supZ. Clearly, for each Π ∈ Π(R),
Π ∩ [z, z] = ∅ =⇒ E[VD(θ, x∗D(θ,Π))] < V0,
so an optimal Π∗ ∈ Π(R) must have a nonempty intersection with [z, z].
Next, we say that y ∈ R is dominated by [z, z] if the agent strictly prefers any decision
in [z, z] to y,
min
z∈[z,z]
UD(θ, z)− UD(θ, y) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
By (A¯1) and (A¯
D
2 , downcrossing in x),
min
z∈[z,z]
UD(θ, z) = min{UD(θ, z), UD(θ, z)}. (19)
By (A¯1) and (A¯
D
2 , aggregate upcrossing in θ),
UD(θ, z)− UD(θ, y) =
∫ z
y
∂
∂x
UD(θ, x)dx > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]
if and only if {
UD(θ, z)− UD(θ, y) > 0 if z > y,
UD(θ, z)− UD(θ, y) > 0 if z < y.
(20)
Let X be the set of all x ∈ R that are not dominated by [z, z]. If x ∈ [z, z], then,
trivially, x ∈ X. If x < z, then, by (19) and (20),
x ∈ X ⇐⇒ UD(θ, x) ≥ min{UD(θ, z), UD(θ, z)}.
If x > z, then, by (19) and (20),
x ∈ X ⇐⇒ UD(θ, x) ≥ min{UD(θ, z), UD(θ, z)}.
Thus, [z, z] ⊂ X and, by (A¯3), X is bounded.
So, we have obtained that (i) if Π∗ is optimal, then it has a nonempty intersection with
[z, z], and (ii) any decision x 6∈ X is dominated by [z, z]. Given that Π∗ ∩ [z, z] 6= ∅,
adding or removing any decisions outside of X does not affect the agent’s behavior,
x∗D(θ,Π
∗) = x∗D(θ,Π
∗ ∪ Y ) = x∗D(θ,Π∗\Y ) for all θ and Y ⊂ R\X.
Hence, for each y < minX and each y > maxX,
E
[
VD(θ, x
∗
D(θ,Π
∗))
]
= E
[
VD(θ, x
∗
D(θ,Π
∗ ∩ [y, y] ∪ {y, y}))]. 
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A.4. Proof of Proposition 2.
1. For Π∗ = {x∗, y, y}, we have
pΠ∗(m) =
{
ν(m∗L) + ν
′(m∗L)(m−m∗L), if m < c(x∗),
ν(m∗H) + ν
′(m∗H)(m−m∗H), if m ≥ c(x∗),
where
m∗L = E[c(s)|s < x∗] and m∗H = E[c(s)|s ≥ x∗].
As shown in Appendix A.3, y is sufficiently small and y is sufficiently large, such that
m∗L =
∫ x∗
y
c(s)ds
x∗ − y =
∫ x′
y
c(s)ds+
∫ x∗
x′ c(s)ds
x′ − y + x∗ − x′ < 0,
m∗H =
∫ y
x∗ c(s)ds
y − x∗ =
∫ x′′
x∗ c(s)ds+
∫ y
x′′ c(s)ds
x′′ − x∗ + y − x′′ > 1,
where the first inequality holds because c(x) < 0 for x < x′ and y  x′ and the
second inequality holds because c(x) > 1 for x > x′′ and y  x′′.
Thus, taking into account (14), we have
pΠ∗(m) =
{
0, if m < c(x∗),
ν(1) +m− 1, if m ≥ c(x∗).
Figure 2(a) shows pΠ∗ as a dashed red curve. The conditions imply that pΠ∗ is convex
and pΠ∗ ≥ ν; so Π∗ is optimal by Theorem 2.
2. For Π∗ = [x∗L, x
∗
H ] ∪ {y, y}, we have
pΠ∗(m) =

ν(m∗L) + ν
′(m∗L)(m−m∗L), if m < c(x∗L),
ν(m), if m ∈ [c(x∗L), c(x∗H)),
ν(m∗H) + ν
′(m∗H)(m−m∗H), if m ≥ c(x∗H),
where
m∗L = E[c(s)|s < x∗L] and m∗H = E[c(s)|s ≥ x∗H ].
As shown in Appendix A.3, y is sufficiently small and y is sufficiently large, such that
m∗L =
∫ x∗L
y
c(s)ds
x∗L − y
=
∫ x′
y
c(s)ds+
∫ x∗L
x′ c(s)ds
x′ − y + x∗L − x′
< 0,
m∗H =
∫ y
x∗H
c(s)ds
y − x∗H
=
∫ x′′
x∗H
c(s)ds+
∫ y
x′′ c(s)ds
x′′ − x∗H + y − x′′
> 1,
where the first inequality holds because c(x) < 0 for x < x′ and y  x′ and the
second inequality holds because c(x) > 1 for x > x′′ and y  x′′.
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Thus, taking into account (14), we have
pΠ∗(m) =

0, if m < c(x∗L),
ν(m), if m ∈ [c(x∗L), c(x∗H)),
ν(1) +m− 1, if m ≥ c(x∗L).
Figure 2(b) shows pΠ∗ as a dashed red curve. The conditions imply that pΠ∗ is convex
and pΠ∗ ≥ ν; so Π∗ is optimal by Theorem 2. In particular, if c(x∗L) ∈ (0, 1), then
pΠ∗(m) is convex at m = c(x
∗
L) because ν(m) is differentiable at all m ∈ (0, 1), by
(14). Moreover, if c(x∗L) = 0, then pΠ∗(m) is convex at m = 0 because ν(m) is convex
at m = 0, by the last line in the conditions. By the same argument, pΠ∗(m) is convex
at m = c(x∗H).
3. For Π∗ = [y, x∗L] ∪ [x∗H , y], we have
pΠ∗(m) =

ν(m), if m < c(x∗L),
ν(m∗) + ν ′(m∗)(m−m∗), if m ∈ [c(x∗L), c(x∗H)),
ν(m), if m ≥ c(x∗H).
Figure 2(c) shows pΠ∗ as a dashed red curve. The conditions imply that pΠ∗ is convex
and pΠ∗ ≥ ν; so Π∗ is optimal by Theorem 2. As in part 2, the last line in the
conditions verifies that pΠ∗(m) is convex at m = c(x
∗
L) and at m = c(x
∗
H) if ν(m) is
not differentiable at these points.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is straightforward but tedious. We only
summarize possible cases. The reader may refer to the corresponding figures for
guidance.
1. There are 4 cases (see Figure 3).
(a) If ν ′(0+) ≥ 0 and ν ′(1−) ≤ 1, then Π∗ = [y, y].
(b) If ν ′(0+) ≥ 0 and ν ′(1−) > 1, then Π∗ = [y, x∗H ] ∪ {y} with c(x∗H) ≤ 1.
(c) If ν ′(0+) < 0 and ν ′(1−) ≤ 1, then Π∗ = [x∗L, y] ∪ {y} with c(x∗L) ≥ 0.
(d) If ν ′(0+) < 0 and ν ′(1−) > 1, then Π∗ = [x∗L, x∗H ] ∪ {y, y} with 0 ≤ c(x∗L) ≤
c(x∗H) ≤ 1.
2. There are 3 cases (see Figure 4).
(a) If ν ′(0+) > 0 and ν ′(1−) < 1, then Π∗ = {x∗L, x∗H , y, y} with c(x∗L) ≤ 0 and
c(x∗H) ≥ 1.
(b) If ν ′(0+) ≤ 0, then Π∗ = {x∗H , y, y} with c(x∗H) ≥ 1.
(c) If ν ′(1−) ≥ 1, then Π∗ = {x∗L, y, y} with c(x∗L) ≤ 0.
3. There are 4 cases (see Figure 5).
(a) If ν ′(0+) ≥ 0 and ν ′(1−) ≥ 1, then Π∗ = [y, x∗M ] ∪ {y} with c(x∗M) ≤ m˜.
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10
ν(m)
pΠ∗(m)
1c(x∗H)0
ν(m)
pΠ∗(m)
(a) (b)
1
c(x∗L)
0
ν(m)
pΠ∗(m)
1c(x∗H)0
ν(m)
pΠ∗(m)
c(x∗L)
(c) (d)
Figure 3. Four Cases in Proposition 3 (Part 1)
0 1c(x∗L) c(x
∗
H)
0 1
c(x∗H) 0 1c(x∗L)
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4. Three Cases in Proposition 3 (Part 2)
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0 1c(x∗M ) 0 1c(x∗M ) c(x∗H)
(a) (b)
0 1c(x∗L) c(x
∗
M ) 0 1c(x
∗
L) c(x
∗
H)c(x
∗
M )
(c) (d)
Figure 5. Four Cases in Proposition 3 (Part 3)
(b) If ν ′(0+) ≥ 0 and ν ′(1−) < 1, then Π∗ = [y, x∗M ] ∪ {x∗H , y} with c(x∗M) ≤ m˜ and
c(x∗H) ≥ 1.
(c) If ν ′(0+) < 0 and ν ′(1−) ≥ 1, then Π∗ = [x∗L, x∗M ] ∪ {y, y} with 0 ≤ c(x∗L) ≤
c(x∗M) ≤ m˜.
(d) If ν ′(0+) < 0 and ν ′(1−) < 1, then Π∗ = [x∗L, x∗M ] ∪ {x∗H , y, y} with 0 ≤ c(x∗L) ≤
c(x∗M) ≤ m˜ and c(x∗H) ≥ 1.
4. There are 4 cases analogous to those in part 3.
(a) If ν ′(0+) ≤ 0 and ν ′(1−) ≥ 1, then Π∗ = [x∗M , y] ∪ {y} with c(x∗M) ≥ m˜.
(b) If ν ′(0+) > 0 and ν ′(1−) ≥ 1, then Π∗ = [x∗M , y] ∪ {x∗L, y} with c(x∗M) ≥ m˜ and
c(x∗L) ≤ 0.
(c) If ν ′(0+) ≤ 0 and ν ′(1−) > 1, then Π∗ = [x∗M , x∗H ] ∪ {y, y} with 1 ≥ c(x∗H) ≥
c(x∗M) ≥ m˜.
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(d) If ν ′(0+) > 0 and ν ′(1−) < 1, then Π∗ = [x∗M , x∗H ] ∪ {x∗L, y, y} with 1 ≥ c(x∗H) ≥
c(x∗M) ≥ m˜ and c(x∗L) ≤ 0.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 2′. For Π∗ = {x0} ∪ [x∗, y], we have
pΠ∗(m) =
{
ν(m∗) + ν ′(m∗)(m−m∗), if m ∈ [c(x0), c(x∗)),
ν(m), if m ≥ c(x∗).
The conditions imply that pΠ∗ is convex and pΠ∗ ≥ ν; so Π∗ is optimal by Theorem 2.
As in Proposition 2, the last line in the conditions verifies that pΠ∗(m) is convex at
m = c(x∗) if ν(m) is not differentiable at this point.
A.7. Proof of Theorem 1′. Consider (UD, VD) ∈ P¯D and (UP , VP ) ∈ P¯P that satisfy
∂UD(t, x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=s
= − ∂UP (s, x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=t
and
∂VD(t, x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=s
= − ∂VP (s, x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=t
(21)
for all s, t ∈ [0, 1]. It suffices to prove that there exists a constant β ∈ R such that
E
[
VD(θ, x
∗
D(θ,Π))
]
= E
[
VP (θ, x
∗
P (θ,Π))
]
+ β for all Π ∈ Π.
Consider Π ∈ Π and let s be uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Define
uΠ(s, t) = E
[
∂UP (s
′, t)
∂t
∣∣∣∣ s′ ∈ µΠ(s)] = E [−∂UD(t, s′)∂s′
∣∣∣∣ s′ ∈ µΠ(s)] ,
vΠ(s, t) = E
[
∂VP (s
′, t)
∂t
∣∣∣∣ s′ ∈ µΠ(s)] = E [−∂VD(t, s′)∂s′
∣∣∣∣ s′ ∈ µΠ(s)] .
Note that uΠ(s, t) is integrable in s and t by (A¯1) and satisfies upcrossing in s and
downcrossing in t by (A¯D2 )/(A¯
P
2 ).
First, consider the balanced delegation problem. By (21), we have, for s ∈ Π,
UD(t, s) = UD(t, 1)−
∫ 1
s
∂UD(t, x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=s′
ds′ = UD(t, 1) +
∫ 1
s
uΠ(s
′, t)ds′,
VD(t, s) = VD(t, 1)−
∫ 1
s
∂VD(t, x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=s′
ds′ = VD(t, 1) +
∫ 1
s
vΠ(s
′, t)ds′.
Since uΠ(s, t) satisfies upcrossing in s, we have
s ∈ y∗(t,Π) = arg max
y∈Π
∫ 1
y
uΠ(s, t)ds
if and only if for all s′, s′′ ∈ Π such that s′ ≤ s ≤ s′′ we have uΠ(s′, t) ≤ 0 ≤ uΠ(s′′, t).
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The principal’s expected payoff is
E
[
VD(t, x
∗
D(t,Π))
]
= E[VD(t, 1)] + E[VD(t, y∗(t,Π))]
= E[VD(t, 1)] +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
y∗(t,Π)
vΠ(s, t)dsdt.
Define
JΠ = {(s, t) ∈ [0, 1]2 : uΠ(s, t) ≥ 0} and J+Π = {(s, t) ∈ [0, 1]2 : uΠ(s, t) > 0},
JΠ = {J ⊂ [0, 1]2 : J+Π ⊂ J ⊂ JΠ, and J is Lebesgue measurable}.
Using Aumann (1965, Theorem 1), we have
E
[
VD(t, x
∗
D(t,Π))
]
= E[VD(t, 1)] +
{∫
(s,t)∈J
vΠ(s, t)dsdt : J ∈ JΠ
}
.
Next, consider the monotone persuasion problem. By (21), we have
E
[
UP (s
′, t)
∣∣s′ ∈ µΠ(s)] = E[UP (s′, 0)∣∣s′ ∈ µΠ(s)]+ ∫ t
0
E
[
∂UP (s
′, t)
∂t
∣∣∣∣ s′ ∈ µΠ(s)] dt′
= E
[
UP (s
′, 0)
∣∣s′ ∈ µΠ(s)]+ ∫ t
0
uΠ(s, t
′)dt′
and
E
[
VP (s
′, t)
∣∣s′ ∈ µΠ(s)] = E[VP (s′, 0)∣∣s′ ∈ µΠ(s)]+ ∫ t
0
E
[
∂VP (s
′, t)
∂t
∣∣∣∣ s′ ∈ µΠ(s)] dt′
= E
[
VP (s
′, 0)
∣∣s′ ∈ µΠ(s)]+ ∫ t
0
vΠ(s, t
′)dt′.
Since uΠ(s, t) satisfies downcrossing in t, we have
t ∈ z∗(s,Π) = arg max
z∈[0,1]
∫ z
0
uΠ(s, t)dt
if and only if for all t′, t′′ ∈ [0, 1] such that t′ ≤ t ≤ t′′ we have uΠ(s, t′) ≥ 0 ≥ uΠ(s, t′′).
The principal’s expected payoff is
E[VP (s, x∗P (s,Π))] = E
[
VP (s, 0)
]
+ E[VP (s, z∗(s,Π))]
= E[VP (s, 0)] +
∫ 1
0
∫ z∗(s,Π)
0
vΠ(s, t
′)dt′ds
= E[VP (s, 0)] +
{∫
(s,t)∈J
vΠ(s, t)dsdt : J ∈ JΠ
}
.
We thus have shown that E
[
VD(θ, x
∗
D(θ,Π))
]
= E[VP (θ, x∗P (θ,Π))]+β for each Π ∈ Π,
where β = E[VD(t, 1)]− E[VP (s, 0)].
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Finally, it is straightforward to verify that if (UD, VD) ∈ P¯D and (UP , VP ) is given
by (3a), then (UP , VP ) satisfies (A¯1) and (A¯
P
2 ), and thus it is in P¯P . Conversely, if
(UP , VP ) ∈ P¯P and (UD, VD) is given by (3b), then (UD, VD) satisfies (A¯1) and (A¯D2 ),
and thus it is in P¯D.
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